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Freeman: Relinquishment of State Owned Minerals - The Agency Relationship

RELINQUISHMENT OF STATE OWNED MINERALSTHE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
"OWNER OF THE SOIL" AND THE STATE
Many laws have been enacted respecting public lands and the
minerals therein ....
To one who will study the intricacies of
our school land laws, and the purposes for which they were enacted, it is quite obvious that they were not always clear in their
meaning . . . . [O]ur school land laws have been to a large
extent patchwork, each law being cumulative of the other, and no
new law repealing a prior law, unless clearly repugnant to the
prior law."'
Title to the minerals beneath public lands granted to private individuals by the state has long been a source of confusion in Texas. Texas
has developed a system whereby the grantees of public lands acquire
either absolute title to the minerals beneath their land or no title whatsoever, but are nevertheless constituted the agent of the state for the
purpose of leasing such minerals. The confusion results from a historic
vacillation between the Spanish system of reserving all mines and minerals to the sovereign, and the Anglo-American system of granting all
minerals to the landowner.'"
The "agency" concept ultimately adopted in Texas with respect to
certain minerals to which the state has retained title represents a hybrid
of the Spanish and Anglo-American systems. Although the surface
owner of such land has no title to the underlying minerals, the agency
authority conferred on him creates an anomalous situation in which he
exercises many of the rights, and enjoys most of the benefits of a fee
simple owner. The agency system is aimed toward maximum development of the state's mineral resources while simultaneously promoting
cooperation between the surface owner and the state's mineral lessee
who must, of necessity, interfere with the landowner's surface rights
in the mining process.20
In 1783 Charles HI of Spain promulgated the Spanish Mining Ordinance reserving all minerals, known and unknown, on all lands, private
18. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 436, 83 S.W.2d 929, 932, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 623 (1935).
19. Although the Anglo-American system generally grants all minerals to the sur-

face owner, there exists an exception whereby all royal mines (gold and silver) were
reserved to the sovereign. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 431, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151
(1912); Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Tex. 217, 223 (1862).
20. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5367, comment (1962); Norman v. Giles, 148
Tex. 21, 26, 219 S.W.2d 678, 681 (1949).
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or public, to the crown."' The ordinance was applicable to Mexico
and, therefore, to Texas. 2 When Texas obtained its independence
from Mexico in 1836, it impliedly retained the Mexican law reserving
the minerals to the sovereign, 23 and in the following year this reservation was expressed in legislation. 4 The policy of separating the patent
of the surface from that of the underlying minerals was reaffirmed by
specific exception to the adoption of the common law in 1840.25
No serious policy change with respect to the reservation of minerals
to the state occurred until Texas enacted the Constitution of 1866.26
An ordinance originally intended only as a release of the minerals of
a particular salt lake to the surface owners was incorporated as a general provision of the constitution releasing all mines and minerals to
all grantees of state land. 7 In 1912 the supreme court decided that
the peculiar circumstances surrounding the enactment of the provision
manifested an intention on the part of the legislature to limit the scope
of its operation.2 8 Accordingly, this first general release, abrogating
the Mexican system of mineral reservation, was held to have retrospective application only. 9 Nearly identical provisions were included in
the constitutions of 186930 and 1876.31 Furthermore, general releases
of minerals to the surface owners appeared as statutes in 187932 and
1895.13 Worded as present releases, each of these statutes and constitutional sections, like the provision in the Constitution of 1866, has
been construed as a retrospective rather than a prospective release of
minerals to the surface owners. 4
21. TEX. CONsT. art. XIV, § 7, comment (1876).
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Tex. Laws 1837, An Act for the Relief of James Erwin and Others § 4, at 1291,
1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1289 (1898); see Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 435,
150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912); State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 265 (1884); Cowan v. Hardeman,
26 Tex. 217 (1862).
25. Tex. Laws 1840, An Act to Adopt the Common Law of England § 2, at 178,
2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 177 (1898).
26. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 39 (1866) states "[t]hat the state of Texas hereby re-

leases to the owner of the soil all mines and mineral substances .....

See State v.

Parker, 61 Tex. 265, 268 (1884).
27. TEx. CONST. art. XIV, § 7, comment (1876); Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426,
433-34, 150 S.W. 1149, 1152-53 (1912).
28. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 434, 150 S.W. 1149, 1153 (1912).

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 434-35, 150 S.W. at 1153.
TEx. CONST. art. X, § 9 (1869).
TEAX. CONST. art. XIV, § 7 (1876).
Tex. Laws 1879, ch. 1, at 545, - H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS - (1898).
33. Tex. Laws 1895, ch. 1, at 801, - H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS - (1898).
34. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 437, 150 S.W. 1149, 1156 (1912); Walker, The
Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FirST INsT TuTE ON On. & GAS
LAW 245, 246 (1949).
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The effective date of the last general mineral release--September
1, 1895 3 -- is highly significant since that statute has also been con86
strued to have retrospective application only.
[This date] is generally accepted by lawyers as a deadline in title
research with regard to mineral ownership. If the title in question
had its origin out of the sovereign prior to that date it is generally
considered that the State of Texas has no interest in any of the

minerals in the land. ..

.

THE RELINQUISHMENT ACT OF 1919

The Relinquishment Act of 191938 was enacted to afford the surface

owner adequate protection from a lessee of the mineral estate."9 Under the former Permit and Lease Act of 1913,40 as amended in
1917,41 purchasers of public school lands acquired no interest in the
underlying minerals.42 All minerals were reserved to the state and
were subject to oil and gas lease by anyone upon applicaton to the
The sole remuneration provided for the surface owner was a
state.
10 cents per acre annual fee, payable by the lessee as compensation

for damages to the surface which occurred during drilling operations. 4
Surface owners considered this to be inadequate compensation for the
loss of a portion of their property rights.4 5 In order to prevent violence

between surface owners and lessees, the Relinquishment Act of 1919
was enacted.

46

35. Tex. Laws 1895, ch. 1, at 801, - H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS - (1898);
Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTTiTUTE ON
OIL & GAS LAW 245, 246 (1949).

36. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 439, 150 S.W. 1149, 1156 (1912); Walker, The
Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS
LAW 245, 246 (1949).
37. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON On. & GAS LAw 245, 246 (1949).
38.

TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5367-5382 (1962).

39. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531-32, 8 S.W.2d 655, 659-60 (1928); Walker,
The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL &
GAS LAW 245, 255-56 (1949).

40. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 173, at 409.
41. Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 83, at 158.
42. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 152-53, 47 S.W.2d 265, 270
(1932).
43. Id. at 152-53, 47 S.W.2d at 270.
44. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 173, at 409; Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 83, at 158; Walker, The
Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS
LAW 245, 255-56 (1949).
45. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTrE ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 256 (1949).
See also Norman v. Giles, 148 Tex. 21,
26, 219 S.W.2d 678, 681 (1949); Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531, 8 S.W.2d 655,
659-60 (1928).
46. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTI-
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As stated in the original enactment of the Relinquishment Act, its
purpose was "[t]o promote the active co-operation of the owner of the
soil and to facilitate the development of . . . [the State's] oil and gas
resources . . . -47 Implementation of this directive was primarily

relegated to a statute which now appears as article 5367:
The State hereby constitutes the owner of the soil its agent .. .
and in consideration therefor, relinquishes and vests in the owner
of the soil an undivided fifteen-sixteenths of all oil and gas which
has been undeveloped and the value of the same that may be upon
and within the surveyed and unsurveyed public free school land
and asylum lands. . . sold with a mineral classification or mineral
reservation . . . . The remaining undivided portion of said oil

and gas and its value is hereby reserved for the use of4 8and benefit
of the public school fund and the several asylum funds.
Article 5367 represents the first example of the special "agency"
concept which Texas has adopted for the development of minerals reserved to the state. The surface owner of land subject to the Relinquishment Act stands in the unique position of acting as the state's
representative for the leasing of state owned minerals, and at the same
time exercises valuable proprietary interests in the minerals. Indeed,
for the first 9 years after its promulgation the Relinquishment Act was
construed as vesting fee simple title to fifteen-sixteenths of the oil and
gas 'in
the surface owner.4 9 The state was thought to have reserved a
"non-participating royalty" of one-sixteenth,50 with all bonuses, rentals,
and royalties being retained by the surface owner."'
Article 5367 -was first construed as placing the surface owner in the
role of the state's agent in the seminal case of Greene v. Robison, 2
where the constitutionality of the Relinquishment Act was challenged.
The Texas Supreme Court was compelled to hold that no title or interOIL & GAS LAW 245, 256 (1949). See also Norman v.Giles, 148 Tex. 21,
26, 219 S.W.2d 678, 681 (1949); Greene v.Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531, 8 S.W.2d 655,
659-60 (1928).
47. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5367, comment (1962); see Greene v.Robison,
117 Tex.516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1928).

TUTE ON

48. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 5367 (1962).

49. Texas Co.v.State, 154 Tex. 494, 501, 281 S.W.2d 83, 87 (1955); Walker, The

Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL
LAw 245, 259 (1949).

FOUNDATION,

FIRST INSTITUTE ON

OIL & GAS

50. See Norman v.Giles, 148 Tex.21, 26, 219 S.W.2d 678, 681 (1949). The terms
"relinquishes" and "vests" as used inarticle 5367 suggested a true conveyance of the
mineral estate. Id. at 26, 219 S.W.2d at 681.
51. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw.LEGAL FOUNDATION, FroST INSTITUTE ON OIL &. GAS LAW 245, 259 (1949).
52. 117 Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655 (1928).
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est in the oil and gas on lands subject to the Relinquishment Act passed
to the surface owner. 3 Furthermore, it was held that the one-sixteenth interest reserved to the state should be considered a royalty,5 4
and "[i]f a bonus is paid, if a larger royalty or other amounts are contracted for, the state and the owner of the soil receive equally in like
amounts." 55 To have held otherwise would have rendered the Relinquishment Act unconstitutional "as making a gift, as constituting an unauthorized diversion of a part of the school fund, and as delegating to
an agent duties imposed by the Constitution upon the Legislature." 56
By construing the Act to mean that whatever payments the surface
owner might receive were merely compensation for damages to the surface estate and for acting in the capacity of the state's agent, the court
7
interpreted the Act to allow it to be held constitutional.
Unlike the earlier general mineral releases to the owners of the soil,
the present Relinquishment Act applies only to public free school and
asylum lands which have been sold with a mineral classification or
mineral reservation. 8 A second distinction is that the Relinquishment
Act applies only to oil and gas,59 whereas the general release acts applied to all minerals. These distinctions are in addition to the fact that
the Relinquishment Act vests no title in the surface owner, but merely
constitutes him the agent of the state for the purpose of leasing the
oil and gas beneath his property. 0 Nor was there found in the general
release acts the Relinquishment Act requirement that the landowner
share equally with the state in all bonuses, rentals, and royalties beyond
the minimum amounts required to be paid to the state. 6' The final dis53. Id. at 527, 8 S.W.2d at 658.
54. Id. at 527, 8 S.W.2d at 658.
55. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 530, 8 S.W.2d 655, 660, (1928). See also
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 156, 158, 47 S.W.2d 265, 271-72 (1932).
56. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 657 (1928).
57. See Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1928).
58. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (1962). The Texas public domain was
classified in 1883 into "free school lands, asylum lands, and university lands; each class
being dedicated to a special purpose; all other lands being designated public lands."
Schendell v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 585, 591, 63 S.W. 1001, 1002 (1901). See also TEx.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 148-50, 47 S.W.2d
265, 268 (1932).
59. TE.x. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (1962); Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 247

(1949).
60. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (1962) Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTION ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 247
(1949).
61. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 533, 8 S.W.2d 655, 660 (1928). See also
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tinction between the Relinquishment Act and the general release acts
is that the former is to be construed as operating both prospectively
and retrospectively, while the latter operated retrospectively only. 62
Although the Relinquishment Act applies both retrospectively and

prospectively, its operation is limited prospectively to the date of the
Sales Act of 1931,63 which superseded the Relinquishment Act. The
Relinquishment Act, therefore, applies to any surveyed or unsurveyed
free school or asylum land sold with a mineral classification during
the 36-year period between September 1, 1895, and August 21,
1931.14 If the land was not sold with a mineral reservation or classification, the surface owner acquired full title to all of the underlying
minerals. 65 Forfeiture of Relinquishment Act land and a subsequent
resale by the state after August 21, 1931 has been held not to deprive
the state of ownership of the minerals in such lands. 60 Because the
land remains subject to the Relinquishment Act, the provisions of the
Act may be applicable to certain sales made after the limiting date. 7
"THE OWNER OF THE SOIL"

The Relinquishment Act provides that "the owner of the soil" is constituted the agent of the state for the purpose of leasing the oil and
gas on certain lands. 68 The interest in the land necessary to confer
this status, however, has been left to judicial construction. It is now
settled that
the right to act as agent provided for in the act was peculiar to the
owner of the soil at the time of a lease or sale, and . . . a prior
Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON
OIL & GAS LAW 245, 247 (1949).
62. Buvens v. Robison, 117 Tex. 541, 544, 8 S.W.2d 664, 665 (1928) Walker, The
Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS
LAw 245, 246, 248 (1949).
63. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c (1962).
64. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 249-50 (1949).
65. Id. at 250.
66. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 437, 83 S.W.2d 929, 932, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 623 (1935); Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL
FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c-1 (Supp. 1974) which

245, 251 (1949). See also TEX. REV.
provides for the grantee of state land
to acquire title to any subsequently discovered excess in acreage. If the original patent
of the land was subject to -the Relinquishment Act, then the excess should also be subject thereto.
67. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 437, 83 S.W.2d 929, 932,
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 623 (1935).
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (1962). See also Greene v. Robison, 117
Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655 (1928).
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owner of the land would have no rights in the matter after title to
the surface had passed out of his hands."9
No problem is presented when the title involved is in fee simple;
where less than fee simple is involved, however, questions have arisen
as to the authority of the possessor of the surface estate to act as the
agent of the state.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that a purchaser under contract
who has not paid the full purchase price for the Relinquishment Act
land is the "owner of the soil" with authority to execute oil and gas
leases for the state.7" Similarly, the owner of an undivided interest in
the surface estate has been held to be authorized to act in this agency
capacity for the other interest owners in the same tract of land. 71 The
owners of such undivided interests share in the royalties and rentals
to be paid the owner of the soil in the proporton that their percentage
of ownership bears to the whole and undivided surface estate. 72 It is
not necessary for the owner of such an undivided interest to secure the
joinder of the other interest owners in order to execute a valid oil and
73
gas lease on Relinquishment Act lands.
It is not fully settled whether a life tenant or a possessor of the soil
under a long term lease should be entitled to "owner of the soil" status.
In Holt v. Giles,7 4 the Texas Supreme Court refused to grant the
agency power to the owner of a 99-year lease on land for grazing and
farming purposes who was in effect a tenant occupying the land. 75 The
holder of an undivided interest in the reversion was held to be the only
one with the authority to execute the Relinquishment Act lease. 76 A
vigorous dissent pointed out that the holder of the lease could be substantially damaged by the development and exploration of oil and gas
on his surface estate, but would be precluded from receiving any relief
under the majority's construction of the Relinquishment Act. 77 The
purpose of the Relinquishment Act-to provide compensation for the
69.
writ).
70.
71.

McDonald v. Dees, 15 S.W.2d 1075, 1077 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929, no
See also Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655 (1928).
Sheldon v. Robison, 117 Tex. 537, 539, 8 S.W.2d 662, 663 (1928).
Holt v. Giles, 150 Tex. 351, 357-58, 240 S.W.2d 991, 994 (1951).

72. Id. at 357-58, 240 S.W.2d at 994.
73. Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74.

150 Tex. 351, 240 S.W.2d 991 (1951).

75. Id. at 357, 240 S.W.2d at 994.
76. Id. at 357, 240 S.W.2d at 994; Note, 30 TFXAs L. REv. 637, 638 (1952).
77. Holt v. Giles, 150 Tex. 351, 362, 240 S.W.2d 991, 996-97 (1951).
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loss of the use of the surface estate 7 -would, therefore, be thwarted.
The fee simple owner would be entitled to the compensation for damages to the soil even though he had no right of possession for many
years.79
A case subsequently decided by the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals
has held that a life tenant is authorized to execute oil and gas leases
as the agent of the state.80 Because the ultimate remaindermen would
be unascertainable until the death of all of the life tenants, it was held
that the objectives of the Relinquishment Act would best be served by
allowing for the life tenant to act as the representative of the state. 8 1
Because the 99-year lease of the surface estate and the life tenancy
are roughly equivalent in that they both entail long term possession of
the surface estate, a distinction between the two interests and between
the two cases would be unwarranted. The cases, therefore, cannot be
reconciled. Undoubtedly the reasoning of the later civil appeals case
is in closer conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Relinquishment Act than is the earlier supreme court case involving the 99year lease. It is the long-term possessor of the surface, regardless of
title ownership, who will be damaged by the exploration and development of the state's oil and gas, and it is he who should receive compensation.
Where marital property rights were involved in the ownership of the
surface estate, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lloyd 2 held that the
power to alienate the surface estate was a prerequisite to having the
agency authority as the "owner of the soil."'8 3 In this case the intestate
spouse's community one-half interest in the surface estate descended
to her children, but the surviving husband was held to have the sole
authority to act as the state's agent for the minerals as long as there
were community property debts.8 4 "Because of the existence of these
78. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531, 8 S.W.2d 655, 659 -60 (1928); Walker,
The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS
LAW 245, 255-56 (1949).

79. See Holt v. Giles, 150 Tex. 351, 362, 240 S.W.2d 991, 996-97 (1951).
80. Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1971,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); see McCoy, Oil and Gas, 26 Sw. L.J. 59, 66 (1972).
81. Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see McCoy, Oil and Gas, 26 Sw. L.J. 59, 66 (1972).

82. 108 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd).
83. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lloyd, 108 S.W.2d 213, 217-19 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd). See also Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw.
LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 280 (1949); 16 TEXAS

L. REv. 418, 419 (1938).
84. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lloyd, 108 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd).
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debts the children, who had inherited their mother's one-half interest
in the land, had no control or management of the community estate."8 5
Without the power to alienate the property, the children were not entitled to the status of "owner of the soil." 8
THE EXTENT OF THE AGENT'S AUTHORITY

The Relinquishment Act does not grant the owner of the soil any
interest or title in the oil and gas under mineral reserved school land,
but merely makes him the agent of the state for the purpose of leasing
7
such land for oil and gas.1
It is clearly implied in the decisions . . . construing the Relinquishment Act . . . that the leasing power . . . of the surface
owner is limited to the execution of an oil and gas lease for bonus,
rental and royalty considerations not less than the statutory minimum and consistent with prevailing values.8 '
Where the surface owner attempts to convey all of the minerals, therefore, such conveyance affects only the minerals other than oil and gas. 9
The state is not required to accede to the unauthorized acts of its
agents, but may repudiate them and ask that they be set aside,"
When the agent has exceeded his authority by attempting to convey
the oil and gas belonging to the state, the opposite party is not entitled
to have the contract enforced even to the extent of the agent's authority.9
Should there exist a mineral lease executed by a prior owner, the
surface owner's agency rights begin upon termination of the previous
lease. a2 Furthermore, where there exists a valid Relinquishment Act
lease on the land, the surface owner has no interest in the lease which
93
will entitle him to bring an action to cancel it.
Where the surface owner undertakes to lease the reserved minerals,
85. Walker, The Texas Relinquishment Act, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIRST INSTI-

TUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW 245, 279 (1949).

86. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lloyd, 108 S.W.2d 213, 217-19 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd).
87. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 SW.2d 655, 658 (1928).
88. State v. Standard. 414 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1967).

89. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1928).

90. State v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-San

Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
91. Id. at 190.
92. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5373 (1962); Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502,
513, 50 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1932).
93. Colquitt v. Gulf Prod. Co., 52 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. Conim'n App. 1932, jdgmt

adopted).
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it will be presumed that he acted as the agent of the state and in compliance with the terms of the Act.94 It is the duty of the surface owner
to secure the highest rental possible, and he may not lease the oil and
gas for less than 10 cents per acre per annum.9 5 The surface owner
and the lessee are limited by statute to the basis of compensation to
be paid the surface owner, 96 and the parties may not contract to alter
97
this or to fix another basis of compensation.
The surface owner's authority to assign his interest in the lease of
the lease income has been specifically recognized. 9 8 Prior to the making of the lease, however, the surface owner has no right to assign or
convey any interest. 9 Although article 5349 requires the filing of assignments of oil and gas leases with the General Land Office, the statute has been held not to apply to the lease and transfer of school
land. 10 0 It has been held, therefore, that the Relinquishment Act does
not require the filing of assignments relating to its lands in the General
Land Office.'
It should also be noted that where a valid oil and gas
lease has been entered into under the Relinquishment Act, the assignee may not challenge a lease provision as violative of the Act.0 2
Despite language in the Relinquishment Act which states that the
state's agent is authorized to "sell or lease" the oil and gas,'0 5 much
of the litigation concerning the Act has dealt with whether a surface
owner has any power at all to convey title to the oil and gas under his
land.1 04 Since 1928 it has been established that "[tihere is no vesting
of title or interest in the oil and gas in the owner of the soil."'0 5 If
the landowner has no title to the minerals, he may not, of course,. lawfully convey them.
94. Permian Oil Co. v. State, 161 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942,

no writ).

95. State v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 S.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
96. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5367, 5379 (1962).
97. State v. Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1967).
98. See TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5368 (1962); Norman v. Giles, 148 Tex.
21, 34, 219 S.W.2d 678, 686 (1949); Lewis v. Oates, 145 Tex. 77, 93-94, 195 S.W.2d
123, 133 (1946); Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502, 513, 50 S.W.2d 769, 772 (1932).
99. Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502, 513, 50 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1932).

100.
n.r.e.).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Labbe v. Carr, 385 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd
Id. at 594.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ham, 228 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1955).
Tax. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5368 (1962).
See Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531-32, 8 S.W.2d 655, 660 (1928)1
Id. at 527, 8 S.W.2d at 658.
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Where the surface owner attempts to convey a fee simple interest
in the oil and gas beneath Relinquishment Act land, the supreme court
has held that the Act should not be read into the agreement between
the parties. 10 6 Rather than interpreting the attempted conveyance as
a Relinquishment Act lease, the entire contract will be considered a
nullity-despite any language in the agreement to the effect that the
surface owner was acting in the capacity of the state's agent under the
auspices of the Relinquishment Act." 7 Whether the instrument is an
attempted fee simple conveyance or an agency lease must be determined as of the time the instrument was executed.108
The strict construction generally accorded the Relinquishment Act
was continued in Ussery v. Hollebeke'0 9 which invalidated a provision
attempting to reserve to the grantors of the surface estate one-half of
the amounts received from the oil and gas and other minerals under
the land."' The court refused to recognize a distinction between an
attempted conveyance of the oil and gas to which the state has absolute
title, and an attempted reservation."' Similarly, an option to acquire
a working interest has been held illegal as consideration for the leasing
of oil and gas under Relinquishment Act lands."'
Finally, where the surface and mineral estates are jointly conveyed,
and it is unknown at the time of the conveyance that the land is subject
to the Relinquishment Act, there is a failure of consideration for the
conveyance to the extent of the consideration given for the oil and
gas"' since the seller had no title in the oil and gas to convey." 4 In
such a case the purchaser who relied on the seller's representations of
sound title to the mineral estate is entitled to a refund of the purchase
price in the amount of the consideration given for the oil and gas." 5
106. Texas Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 501-502, 281 S.W.2d 83, 88 (1955). The
supreme court concluded that should the Relinquishment Act be read into the instrument
in order to sustain its validity, the integrity of the instrument would be destroyed. Id.
at 501-502, 281 S.W.2d at 88.
107. Id. at 502, 281 S.W.2d at 88.
108. Id. at 500, 281 S.W.2d at 87.
109. 391 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
110. Id. at 500.
111. id. at 499.
112. State v. Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1967); see Note, 46 TExAs L. REv.
403, 405 (1968).
113. Hill v. Ellsworth, 35 S.W.2d 704, 705-706 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt
adopted).
114. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1928).
115. Hill v. Ellsworth, 35 S.W.2d 704, 706-707 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt
adopted).
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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
THE AGENCY STATUS AS A VALUABLE RIGHT

Even though the surface owner has no title in the oil and gas beneath
land subject to the Relinquishment Act, he does have a valuable
proprietary interest in the royalty due him after he has executed an
oil and gas lease as the state's agent. 1 " It is somewhat incongruous
that these royalties, whether payable in kind or in money, "should be
adjudged to be present interests in land"' 1 7 when the surface owner
has no fee interest in the oil and gas. Even more extreme is the view
that in the absence of a lease, the surface owner's agency power is a
valuable right for which he should receive compensation in the event
of condemnation of the surface."" The reasons for this anomalous
situation whereby the surface owner has been held to have no title in
the minerals beneath land subject to the Relinquishment Act, and at
the same time enjoys a valuable proprietary interest in the right to act
as the state's agent, are purely historical. It should be remembered
that from 1866 until 1919 the policy of the state had been to release
all minerals absolutely to the surface owners, and that this policy was
continued for the first 9 years of the Relinquishment Act's existence.
Further, the construction of the Relinquishment Act "creating" the
agency concept was adopted solely for the purpose of rendering the Act
constitutional." 19
Vestiges of a fee interest in the minerals beneath lands patented under the Relinquishment Act, therefore, continue to be associatd with
the "owner of the soil" status. Thus, the agency concept permits the
surface owner to act and enjoy the minerals beneath these lands in
much the same manner as if he had a fee interest in them, although
he theoretically has no such interest.
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE AGENT

Although the agency authority has been held to be a valuable right
accruing for the benefit of the surface owner, both the surface owner
and the lessee are subject to duties and liabilities pursuant to the Relinquishment Act. In the first place, the surface owner is obligated to
obtain the best possible price for the lease beyond the 10 cents per
116. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 660 (1928). See also
Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 291-92, 110 S.W.2d 53, 57 (1937).
117. Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 292, 110 S.W.2d 53, 57 (1937).
118. State v. Figueroa, 389 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Schooler v.
State, 175 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
119. Cf. Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 527, 8 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1928).
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acre statutory minimum. 12 The Commissioner of the General Land
Office has the statutory duty to refuse to accept for filing any lease under the Relinquishment Act which does not recite the true consideraton
paid for the lease. 2 ' Because the filing of the lease is a prerequisite
to its taking effect, the land commissioner is in a position to make certain that at least the market value is paid for the lease.
The second basic obligation of the surface owner, as well as that of
the lessee, is the liability to pay the state its one-half of all bonuses
and rentals in excess of the statutory minimum.' 22 In the event that
the lessee has paid the surface owner the entire amount of the bonuses
and rentals under a mistake of fact that the surface owner is entitled
to them, the lessee is entitled to indemnity against the surface owner
12 3
should the state sue the lessee for its half.
The third obligation of the surface owner is statutory." 4 If there
is a producing oil or gas well on non-Relinquishment Act land which
is draining the oil and gas beneath Relinquishment Act land, the surface owner of the Relinquishment Act land has a good faith obligation
to commence the drilling of an offset well within 100 days of the com25
mencement of production on the non-Relinquishment Act land.
FORFEITURE OF THE AGENCY POWER

It is possible for the surface owner to lose his agency powers, although the situations in which this can occur are very limited and are
readily cured.
The only express statutory authority for forfeiture of the leasing
authority of the surface owner is that provided by Article 5370,
namely, failure to drill an offset well. . .. The statute contemplates a continuing and perpetual agency unless forfeited on this
statutory ground or perhaps on equitable grounds ..
such as the
fraud of the agent, or his failure or inability to act.' 2 6
Prior to 1949 it had been held that "the statute [article 5370] requires
no notice of it to be given to the parties interests, and they are doubt120. State v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 S.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
121. TEx. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c-2 (1962).
122. Cross v. Shell Oil Co., 144 Tex. 78, 82, 188 S.W.2d 375, 377-78, conformed
to 189 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945).
123. Shell Oil Co. v. Lutz, 155 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941,
writ refd w.o.m.).
124. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5369, 5370 (1962).
125. TEx. REV.Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5369 (1962).
126. State v. Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1967).
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less charged with notices of their own default . . .". If the lessee
of Relinquishment Act land failed to drill the offset well, then the
agent's leasing authority was automatically terminated at the same time
as the forfeiture of the lease.' 28
As a result of a 1949 amendment to article 5370, the agent's leasing
authority is no longer automatically terminated with the forfeiture of
the lessee's interest, and forfeiture is no longer possible without notice
to the parties. 29 Article 5370 now provides that where Relinquishment Act lands are leased, and the land commissioner becomes aware
of violations of the statutes requiring the drilling of offset wells,
[he] shall, on the wrapper containing the papers relating to such
lease, write and sign officially words declaring such forfeiture, and
the lease and all rights thereunder shall thereupon be forfeited
together with all payments made thereunder. Notice of such
action shall forthwith be mailed to the . . . owners of the surface
and the owners of the forfeited lease . .. .l0
Within 30 days of the forfeiture, and on proper showing by the lessee,
Should the comthe lease may be reinstated by the commissioner.'
notify
he must
lease,
however,
missioner choose not to reinstate the
2
leasing.11
for
available
the surface owner that the land is again
If the surface owner has not satisfied the requirement for drilling
an offset well within 100 days of such notification, his rights under the
In such an event the forfeited agency
Act also will be terminated.'
rights are automatically reinstated upon the termination of any lease
executed by virtue of article 5371 which provides the means for leasing
3
the oil and gas after forfeiture.1 1
It is only after a lengthy process in which notice of potential forfeiture is given on two separate occasions, therefore, that the surface
owner's agency authority becomes terminable. Even so, the termination is only temporary. The automatic reinstatement of the agency
status and the absence of any penalty other than temporary forfeiture
for breach of the agency duties further illustrates the similarity between
the agency status and fee simple ownership of the minerals.
127. Normal v. Giles, 148 Tex. 21, 33, 219 S.W.2d 678, 686 (1949).

128. Id. at 33, 219 S.W.2d at 686.
129. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5370 (1962).
130. Id.
131.

id.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 5371 (1962); see Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex.
516, 533, 8 S.W.2d 655, 660 (1928).
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OTHER STATUTES CONSTITUTING THE OWNER OF THE SOIL
THE AGENT OF THE STATE

The agency concept for the leasing of state owned minerals is firmly
entrenched in Texas law. Even the statute which superseded the Relinquishment Act, the Sales Act of 1931,11 which provides for a "free
royalty" to the state of a fractional interest from the minerals produced,
has been construed as creating such an agency relationship. 3 6 In
Winterman v. McDonald1"7 the supreme court held that although the
Sales Act of 1931 does not specifically provide that the surface owner
of lands sold under the act is entitled to the agency status for the purpose of leasing the underlying minerals, public policy impliedly38authorizes the surface owner to act in the capacity of the state's agent.'
A 1967 statute, article 5421c-10, expressly recognizes the surface
owner as the state's agent for the purpose of leasing state owned coal,
lignite, sulphur, potash, uranium, thorium, and any other minerals produced in conjunction with them. 139 Although the statute has not yet
been judicially construed, under its terms the lessee pays to the state
60 percent of all bonuses, rentals, and royalties and pays the remaining
40 percent to the surface owner.' 40 In the event of production, the
state is entitled to one-sixteenth of the revenue from the minerals
produced. The provision that all payments made by the lessee to the
is identical in effect
surface owner shall be in lieu of all other damages
141
Act.
Relinquishment
the
in
to the provision found
CONCLUSION

The agency concept for the development of state owned minerals
is anomalous to the remainder of Texas land titles law. Although the
surface owner of land beneath which there is state owned minerals has
no title to such minerals, he nevertheless receives almost all of the
revenue from the sale of such minerals; he has been held to have a
valuable interest in the minerals which is compensable upon condemnation of the surface estate; and he enjoys automatic reinstatement of
the agency authority and benefits after forfeiture. The only explanation
for the development of this concept is that it is historical.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c (1962).
Winterman v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 275, 285, 102 S.W.2d 167, 172-73 (1937).
Id. at 275, 102 S.W.2d at 167.
Id. at 285, 102 S.W.2d at 172-73,
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c-10, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
Id. § 2.
Compare id. § 4 with TEx. REv. Civ. SrAT. ANN. art. 5379 (1962).
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The agency concept came into existence in order to placate surface
owners whose property was being damaged by the drilling operations
of the state's lessees.14 2 It was specifically designed for the production
of oil and gas under such circumstances. The legislature should be
cautious in enacting similar statutes providing for the same basis of
compensation as in the Relinquishment Act of 1919 when other minerals than oil and gas are involved. Mining and development processes
in taking coal and lignite are vastly different from those used in the
production of oil and gas. If the agency concept is to be retained in
such circumstances, investigation should be made into the amount of
damages necessary to compensate the surface owner for the development of each type of mineral.
A contingency not yet considered by the legislature is the possibility
of one lessee developing the oil and gas pursuant to the Relinquishment Act, and another lessee developing other minerals under article
5421c-10 on the same trace of land at the same time. None of the
"agency" statutes provide any means for establishing priority for the
use of the surface estate in such a case. The land commissioner's authority to file or refuse to file a mineral lease may be the only method
for controlling the number of lessees entitled to enter the surface
14 3
owner's property at one time.
Even so, the agency concept adopted in Texas provides the most
practical method available for administrating the development of state
owned minerals. Although the surface owner has no title to such minerals, he enjoys most of the benefits of title ownership. The difference
between ascribing a value to the agency status and granting title to the
minerals is minimal. The effect of ascribing a value to the agency
status, however, is to satisfy to a large extent the traditional policy of
releasing the minerals to the grantees of public lands. At the same
time, the state derives valuable revenue from its share of the proceeds.
Finally, by giving the surface owner the authority to act as the state's
agent, the leasing process is facilitated. The state is relieved of the
substantial burden of executing the leases, and the surface owner has
at least a limited choice of whom he would prefer as the lessee.
142. 'See Norman v. Giles, 148 Tex. 21, 26, 219 S.W.2d 678, 681 (1949); Greene
v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 531, 8 S.W.2d 655, 659-60 (1928).

143. See TEX. REv. Civ.
1974).

STAT. ANN.

art. 5421c-2 (1962), art. 5421c-10, § 3 (Supp.
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